EU at the UN: The Effects of its New Rights Agenda on International Social Structures by Yoshihara, Susan, & Sylva, Douglas.
EU at the UN:  
The Effects of its New Rights Agenda on International Social Structures 
 
Susan Yoshihara and Douglas Sylva
1
 
Paper for presentation at EUSA, 17 May 2007, Montreal 
Draft only: please do not cite without permission 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to determine the effect of the EU’s human rights agenda on 
the international institution of human rights, and the resulting effect on 
interstate society. To do this, the study examines the way the EU has 
promoted new norms of gender and the family at the ECOSOC third 
committee. Using Barry Buzan’s concept of vanguard theory of international 
social structures, it identifies a trend toward more contested norms that 
require coercive measures to promote as human rights. As illuminated by the 
vanguard theory, this is likely to result in the weakening human rights as an 





For several years, EU scholars have taken note of the need for more research focused on 
the way the EU works at the UN outside the Security Council.
2 Several excellent studies 
have recently concluded that EU member states are increasingly speaking with one voice, 
especially on human rights issues.
3 The EU has been promoting a unique and very 
progressive normative agenda in New York and Geneva, spurred on by the adoption and 
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 enforcement of these progressive norms in Brussels and at the ECHR. The present study 
seeks to determine the effects of this agenda on the international institution of human 
rights, and on international society.  The broader question we seek to answer is whether 
an increasingly unified and assertive EU on the world stage is having a destabilizing 
effect on international order.  
Will realist assertions be borne out as the emergence of Europe causes a shift to a 
new bipolar balance of power? Or does EU grand strategy represent something genuinely 
new: a civilian or normative power that primarily seeks the promotion of values and 
multilateralism? According to the European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a 
Better World, “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and rule-based international order is our 
objective….Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities 
and to act effectively, is a European priority.”
 4 Does the way the EU operates at the UN 
help or hinder these goals?  
This study applies English School theory to analyze the EU’s rights agenda at the 
UN, specifically Barry Buzan’s “vanguard theory of international social structures.” The 
next section introduces the theory and the way it is applied here. The following section 
provides details of the case at hand: Europe’s agenda on the ECOSOC third committee 
during the period of 2001-2006.  Then the study offers analysis, proposes findings and 
policy implications, and concludes with suggestions for further research.  
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  2THEORY AND METHODOLOGY  
The study of the EU’s promotion of new norms on gender and the family at the 
UN presents a significant theoretical challenge. Essentially, it is a “levels of analysis” 
problem, since we are attempting to understand what is happening at the level of values 
and ideas, the inter-state or regional level of the EU, and the international level at the UN. 
Normative theory, institutional approaches, and grand theory have been used to examine 
the various levels. While and English School (ES) approach sacrifices the predictive 
qualities of the individual theories, it makes up for this in allowing us to examine the 
dynamics among the three levels.  It also lends itself to historical analysis of trends in 
thought and institutions.   
The Legitimacy of International Institutions and  
The Stability of Interstate Society 
This paper uses Barry Buzan’s recent adaptation of Martin Wight’s model, building on 
the three traditions (realism, rationalism and revolutionism), accounting for the presence 
of interstate societies, and allowing for the rise and fall of international social structures.  
One of the “primary institutions” Buzan identifies in the contemporary context is 
international human rights.
5 Primary institutions come and go, and among past 
institutions are colonialism, congresses, messengers, and religious festivals. The point 
here is that human rights only very recently emerged as an international institution, and 
could very well go the way of bygone institutions under the right, or wrong, 
circumstances. The decline of colonialism brought destabilization of world order with the 
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  3emergence of so many new sovereign states, but its passing as an international institution 
is certainly seen as a positive event. The deterioration of the Congress of Vienna was also 
destabilizing but not so benign, since it was brought to an end by the First World War and 
brought the revival of great power politics. It has become a tenet of the ES that the 
presence of international society is evident by the number and strength of its institutions. 
In his recent work, Barry Buzan has also liked the strength of institutions
6 to the stability 
of interstate societies: 
It seems safe to say that there will be a close relationship between where an 
international society is located on the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, and either 
what type of institutions it has, or how it interprets any given institution.
7
 
Hence a society may have many institutions, but each nation may understand the 
institutions differently, give them different degrees of importance, and embrace them 
only at the elite level. This is the mark of a pluralist society, a realist world order marked 
by conflict, competition or at best coexistence. On the pluralist end of the spectrum, 
Buzan identifies behavior among states that is apolitical, power political, and coexistence. 
On the solidarist end, the behavior continues to range from cooperative, to convergence, 
and finally to confederalism.
8 In the case of solidarism, institutions such as human rights, 
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  4international law, and sovereignty are important, similarly interpreted, and embraced 
strongly by citizens and elites alike. According to ES logic, the more solidarist 
characteristics a society has, the more stable it becomes.  
It is important to note that solidarist society is not compatible with coercion where 
such behavior is not legitimate. In the case of rights, solidarism requires their acceptance 
of norms by belief not coercion:  
Interstate societies based on coercion will be less stable than those based on 
calculation, which will be less stable than those based on 
belief/identity….legitimacy is crucial to the stability of any political order.
9  
 
Furthermore coercion is also incompatible with stability in a solidarist society. Stability 
requires that the content of the rights be non-controversial, and deeply, even passionately 
held. Also, it matters who shares the values. Buzan notes that if  
[R]uling elites support a value, but their citizens mostly oppose it, one finds the 
grounds for a tension between international and world society that so worries 
some English School writers. …variations of this kind will make a difference to 
the stability of international society, opening up the possibility that even quite 
advanced, seemingly solidarist international societies may in fact be quite fragile, 
and vulnerable to sudden reversals…Thus a value such as human rights, or 
economic liberalism, might be quite widely held if viewed simply as a matter of 
government policy across a set of states, but be fragile because of the way it is 
held within some or all of those states.
10
 
Further, the higher the number of shared values or rights also, the more evidence of 
solidarism.
11  And finally, Buzan also notes that “one would expect fewer institutions at 
the pluralist end of the spectrum and more at the solidarist end.”
12    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“significant IGOs of the forum kind, like the UN, but also secondary institutions of a more integrative sort, 
like those in the EU.” Ibid., 194-195. 
9 Ibid., 253. 
10 Ibid., 155.  
11 Ibid., 157. 
12 Ibid., 190. 
  5Three explanations for EU’s effect on world order 
Buzan brings constructivism into ES thought by allowing for Alexander Wendt’s notion 
of thickness and thinness of norms and institutions. To illustrate the difference, Buzan 
likens the world to a fried egg with one or more yolks representing thick, presumably 
solidarist, international societies. The egg white represents norms and values that are 
shared globally but only thinly. The yolk represents a society in which shared norms are 
many in number, deeply believed, and democratically adhered to.  In fact, Buzan 
concludes that the EU is the world’s thickest interstate society. In the transition or 
“thickening” process, certain institutions are downgraded or dropped.
13  Thus as the EU 
gets more cohesive, it will have an effect on the thickness or thinness of international 
institutions and thus on the stability of world order. Buzan urges ES scholars to explore 
what problems arise when interstate societies thicken, and he proposes three alternatives. 
According to Buzan, the integration of the EU and the assertion of its foreign policy will 
result in one of three alternatives:  
1) A thickening in one part of the world will cause a second order pluralism or 
coexistence to emerge. This was the case in the Cold War in which a thickening on two 
sides of an ideological divide emerged.  The United States and USSR did not all together 
abandon primary institutions, but there was certainly a thinning or move toward 
pluralism, coexistence; 
2) A thickening in one part of the world will cause a thickening of institutions on the 
global level. If this is true, then one would expect to see the EU’s approach to human 
rights cause an overall strengthening or thickening of the international human rights 
though a vanguard-led process.  
                                                 
13 Ibid, 195. 
  63) A thickening in one part of the world will cause a first order pluralism and 
destabilizing of world order. Buzan warns us that this is the prediction of his predecessors 
Hedley Bull and John Vincent.  We propose that the first and third alternative is more 
likely than the second, and that the third is the most likely. We use the vanguard theory of 
international social structures to examine what is happening. Buzan likens the spread of 
Europe’s values and institutions in the nineteenth century to a vanguard, and notes that 
coercion was a mainstay. He warns, “the danger of accepting vanguard explanations is 
well known from the Marxist experience…and the justification of violent means on that 
basis can be made by extremists of all sorts.”
14 No matter how distasteful it is to admit, 
coercion worked in spreading the norms and institutions of present day international 
society.  
Vanguard theory of social structures and the role of coercion and deception 
 
  According to the vanguard theory, coercion must be minimal if the vanguard is to 
“thicken” human rights on a global scale. In order to assess the EU’s effects as a 
vanguard for international human rights, we use the following questions from the 
vanguard theory: do states adopt the EU’s new norms on gender and the family? If so, is 
this out of belief, calculation or coercion? Are the new norms contentious or not? Are 
there a growing or decreasing number of new norms shared? Who is adopting these new 
norms – elites alone, or also the citizenries?   
  Thomas Schelling famously observed that the power to hurt is bargaining power, 
and to exploit that is diplomacy.
15 Even though the EU security strategy renounces (and 
reflects the widespread belief that Europe has renounced) coercion in a turn to 
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  7“multilateralism”, coercion remains a tool of international negotiation.  In the hammering 
out of international human rights treaties, there are three main options:  
1) Persuasion which relies on the merit of the objective, the reasonableness of the 
argumentation and the attraction to the value, norm, right or other objective; 
2) Hard bargaining or soft coercion, such as the fear of the loss of financial inducements, 
or of reciprocity in voting. Another bargaining tactic common in the contentious milieu 
of human rights is the “bait and switch” of filling up draft documents with contentious 
language to divert the attention and energy of opposing coalitions and states.  
3) Deception, when bargaining fails, by getting consensus on undefined language or 
phrases (Trojan horses) with the intent of re-defining them later with controversial 
meanings at an elite level.
16 In this study we have termed this “multilateral opacity.”  
  These can be used sequentially or concurrently. The EU finds coercion and 
deception necessary to get contentious new norms and rights into negotiated texts. 
Presumably, once contentious norms have gained acceptance by a large number of states 
and opposing states and blocks are successfully isolated, the EU can revert to persuasion 
to maintain momentum of advancing the new norms. Only then, when deception and 
coercion are no longer necessary, could we expect to see a global “thickening” of human 
rights a move toward solidarism in international society.  
ADVANCING NEW NORMS OF GENDER AND THE FAMILY 
  What follows are accounts that help assess the EU rights agenda and test it 
according to Buzan’s vanguard theory.   To what extent has it helped promote the 
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  8institution of human rights, a more solidarist or Grotian international society at the global 
level, and a world order built around liberal economic values, territorial sovereignty, 
international law, and diplomacy?
17  Success or failure with regard to progressive gender 
and family norms will have ramifications for the larger European project. We shall see 
that there is an inherent tension between the two projects, and the EU is now even 
apparently willing to threaten or at least circumscribe essential elements of the initial 
project in order to promote the new project.    
Using Buzan’s criteria, this section examines to what extent the methods are 
adopted by the EU to promote these new norms coercive and are the new norms accepted 
by other states, and if so is a deep or shallow acceptance. It shows that the EU has 
engaged in a multi-faceted strategy, varying from persuasion to “soft coercion”, but that 
these have had limited utility with the new agenda.  
A third, more controversial approach has been used in recent years to circumvent 
strong opposition to some of the new rights agenda.  It is relatively new and increasingly 
important form of soft coercion tailored to the evolving structural setting of the United 
Nations human rights milieu. We have labeled “multilateral opacity”: the use of benign 
language in negotiated documents with the intent of redefining the terms outside the 
negotiation setting. The approach essentially requires the masking of the true intent of 
specific phrases within multilateral negotiations to promote progressive norms. This is 
necessary to gain the assent of nations that would otherwise be in opposition to those 
norms. We find this approach coercive in nature because of the masking function, which 
undermines openness and transparency in international negotiations, and forces member 
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  9states to contemplate decisions regarding new national obligations based upon incomplete 
information, thereby creating the setting for various other forms of pressure to be 
applied.
18  
After nations assent to these opaque phrases, the EU can employ its mastery of 
the UN’s deliberative process to establish the acceptable interpretations of the phrases, 
including its extensive investment of resources. This includes the 27 separate diplomatic 
staffs of member states, as well as member appointments to official UN positions in the 
Secretariat, as Special Rapporteurs, and to the UN human rights treaty bodies which act 
as interpretive and quasi-enforcement bodies.   
There are certain phrases that the EU focuses upon each year in the General 
Assembly, such as “reproductive health services” and “various forms of the family exist.” 
These phrases have never been defined at the General Assembly, and are at the heart of 
the strategy of opacity in the effort to promote new norms on gender and the family.   
It is important to note that this approach runs counter to the now long-standing 
tradition of United Nations negotiations, a tradition that ties legitimacy of the emerging 
international social order to the depth of understanding of the assenting member states.  
Perhaps more important still is that fact that a strategy of deliberate opaqueness 
runs counter to the demand and necessity for transparency in contemporary multiparty 
negotiations in which civil society and public diplomacy play an ever larger role.
19  One 
of the most enduring characteristics during the development of multilateral negotiation at 
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  10the UN has been the carefully crafted – often excruciatingly carefully crafted – 
definitions of essential terms that will form the basis of new national obligations, from 
terms related to national sovereignty and to the legitimate use of force to matters of 
international social policy such as the scope and limits of parental authority contained in 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The strategy of multilateral 
opacity has thus reversed or even replaced the tradition of exactness in defining language 
in international treaties. This trend has brought with it important changes in the tenor and 
efficacy of international debate, certainly introducing additional elements of distrust and 
suspicion into today’s multiparty negotiations.  
  One important reason that persuasion and even soft coercion have not been 
sufficient for the EU to succeed in advancing its rights agenda is cultural and religious 
barriers in much of the developing world. An increasingly assertive and self-confidant 
Islamic block of nations now covering large parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, 
and Christian nations in Latin America and Africa, both limit the attractiveness of the EU 
norms, which can even be conceived of as replacements for the traditional norms 
embedded within these cultures/religions. 
Multilateral opacity is therefore needed – and its success has been decidedly 
mixed. This is essentially a strategy of deception, but it is also a form of coercion since it 
requires that nations accept the ill-defined or undefined phrases. But the EU’s approach is 
therefore vulnerable to a countervailing strategy of definition-setting. The demand for 
definition and clarification comes from the EU’s most consistent adversaries on the new 
rights agenda in addition to the Islamic block: the United States under the direction of the 
  11Bush administration and the Holy See Mission to the United Nations.
20 There exist ample 
strategies of discovery or definition-setting that are effective in countering the EU’s 
multilateral opacity and it makes the EU’s current approach vulnerable and even risky. 
This is compounded by the increasing involvement of civil society in negotiations since 
the Cairo conference of 1994. After the publicity surrounding the controversial 
conference, there has developed a tradition-minded component of civil society that acts at 
the UN level to perform many of these same functions, with the goal of increasing 
transparency in international negotiations. 
Redefining family 
The two primary goals requiring multilateral opacity are redefinition of the family 
and promotion of reproductive rights.  Since at least 2001, the EU has acted upon an 
internal consensus on how the very term “family” would be referenced by EU Member 
States and by the European Union rotating presidency. In almost all cases in which 
“family” arises in UN dialogue, the EU adds the clause “in all its forms” or “noting that 
various forms of the family exist.”
21 These are the phrases that EU puts forward time and 
again during international negotiations on social policy.  
This has proved more than just a semantic decision, or a symbolic nod to 
diversity; in 2004, during the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the International 
Year of the Family, this position led the European Union to oppose a widely-supported 
                                                 
20 It is often the case that these states demand that the EU and its allies define the phrases that they seek to 
insert into negotiated documents, or that the United States and the Holy See educate other nations as to 
what the phrases could potentially mean in international law, or what they could mean to the compliance 
committees entrusted with the interpretative authority over UN conventions and treaties. Or it is often the 
case that the United States and the Holy See offer their own definitions for the contested phrases, usually 
asserting that they recognize the creation of no new human rights around the issues of family and gender 
norms (see, for instance, the recent US statements made at the annual Commission on the Status of 
Women).  
21 EU Presidency Statement, Women in Development, 6 November 2001. 
  12General Assembly resolution. The resolution was promoted vigorously by the United 
States, however it did not reflect the evolving EU understanding of family by mentioning 
the necessary phrase “various forms,” and it was therefore opposed by the EU.    
One of the EU presidency statements on the subject explains the EU’s decision to 
vote against the resolution:      
The European Union recognizes the crucial role of parents, carers and families in 
improving outcomes for children and young people and the need to provide 
support for them to do so. We share the view of many in this room about the 
valuable contribution that families make to strengthening our societies and the 
need to develop policies to support their role. But for these policies to be 
successful, they must also be inclusive. Across the European Union, as in the rest 
of the world, families have changed and continue to change with time – 
illustrating the fact that a family is a living, dynamic entity. In this regard, the 
European Union believes that we must all continue to recognise this diversity, as 
we did at the various UN conferences and summits of the 1990s, and that our 
ongoing policy discussion and development should similarly continue to reflect 




What the statement obscures is that the resolution the EU opposed simply restated the 
longstanding conception of family that is found in most of the seminal UN documents – 
the very founding documents of the United Nations (and therefore the very founding 
documents of the successful solidarist project long sought after by European nations). 
The phrase that the EU opposed in the GA resolution is, with slight variation, common to 
all of these documents: “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society.” 
This is so even though the term is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State”.
23 The term is found in International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): “The family is the natural and fundamental group 
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  13unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State”.
24 And it is found in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “Convinced that the family, as the 
fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being 
of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection 
and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.”
25 
The EU’s new definition therefore departs from negotiated treaty language and it must 
therefore break consensus to introduce the new language. 
Breaking consensus to advance new norms  
Few doubt that the EU takes this pathfinder role in international human rights 
seriously. In this case, it was willing to break consensus on the General Assembly 
resolution, thereby opposing a resolution introduced by the Group of 77 and China – the 
developing world – and backed by the EU’s most important worldwide ally, the United 
States. This is true even though the resolution merely repeated the language cited above, 
and even though the resolution would have had no major impact on international 
programming, since it possessed almost no operative language. The rather limited 
intentions of the drafters of the resolution was obvious even at the time, as a United 
Nations Press Centre news release makes clear: “Qatar’s representative, speaking on 
behalf of the ‘Group of 77’ developing countries and China said the main purpose of the 
text was to recognize the celebration of the Year, and to commend the positive responses 
and efforts of Member States and international agencies to promote the aims and 
principles of the Year.”
26   
                                                 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23 (1). 
25 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Preamble.
26 United Nations News Centre Press Release, GA/10311, 12 June 2004. 
  14In other words, the resolution was one of a myriad of symbolic resolutions the 
General Assembly puts forward every year, which are passed and then promptly 
forgotten. The resolution was merely to “recognize the celebration of the Year.” Nor was 
there any real threat that the resolution, if passed, would have possessed any particular 
standing with regard to international law, or would have set any sort of important 
international legal precedent. Since it was passed three years ago, it has not once been 
referenced in any major international forum where family was being discussed. In fact, 
the momentary prominence the resolution gained was specifically because the EU 
opposed it. Therefore, the EU did not need to fight this battle and risk alienating allies. It 
could have let the resolution pass and fade from memory in the way most member states 
react when on the losing side of UN negotiations. This indicates that the values or 
interests at stake in the negotiations are considered to be so important that it is worth 
standing up for them, even in defeat, and worth upsetting consensus – the fuel upon 
which the United Nations runs – and the fuel that will push the international social 
structure towards the solidarism so favored by the EU. 
According to EU statements this move was made in the name of the diversity of 
family forms – but the meaning of this is unclear from those same statements.  The 
question therefore arises: what caused the EU to go to such lengths in this case. After all, 
the diversity of families is nothing new. Divorces, deaths, disruptions occur often, and the 
resulting varieties of family forms are recognized globally. Nor can this represent an EU 
embrace of some kind of sweeping and unlimited relativism of family forms, since there 
are some kinds of diverse families, such as families based upon child-marriage, that the 
  15EU certainly does not support.
27 Not surprisingly, most analysts have concluded that the 
point of highlighting, repeatedly and with such vigor, that “various forms of the family 
exist,” is to promote progressive norms centered upon homosexual marriage and 
reproductive rights. The EU statement, issued by the delegation of the Netherlands, on 
the day of General Assembly debate on the proposed resolution for the tenth anniversary 
of the International Year of the Family, confirms this contention. First, as reported by the 
United Nations News Centre, the EU reiterates its recognition of the diversity of family 
forms:  
In different cultural, political and social systems, various forms of the family 
existed, he continued, adding that, although the family was indeed society’s ‘basic 
unit,’ its concept and composition had changed over time, illustrating the fact that 
a family was a living, dynamic entity.  Within the European Union, for instance, 
there had been a substantial increase in the number of single-person households, 
and by the year 2025 such households were projected to exceed 60 million – 
almost one third of all family structures.
28   
 
Next, the EU illustrates the types of families that do not fit into the legitimate range of 
such diversity:  
While recalling that marriage should be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses, the European Union would express concern at 
the negative implications that might result from early marriages, in particular with 
regard to early child-bearing maternal mortality….He also stressed that families 
needed to provide a safe environment for children, and that family violence, under 
any circumstances, in any country could not be treated as a private matter. 
 Domestic violence, including marital rape, needed to be criminalized, and child 
abuse needed to be eradicated.
29   
 
Finally, the EU expounds upon how the legitimately constituted family diversity should 
be expanded, first, with a rather subtle insertion of “sexual orientation” on the list of 
                                                 
27 The EU has spoken out repeatedly against child-marriage; see, for instance, the EU Presidency 
Statement, Rights of the Child, 14 October 2005. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
  16attributes that cannot rightly be used by the state to limit an individual’s right to marry 
and found a family:  
Here, he stressed that every individual of full age had the right to found a family: 
 it was not up to the State to impose limitations based on race, nationality, 
religion, sexual orientation or any other status.
30
 
Needless to say, such an insertion would constitute a revolutionary expansion of the UN-
recognized “right to marry.” For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.”
31  Not only has the EU added 
sexual orientation, but it has also added the phrase “or any other status,” thereby implying 
that there are no legitimate grounds for a state to deny two (or perhaps more) people the 
right to marry. This has led opponents of these norms to argue that the EU is actually 
attempting to promote a radical redefinition of marriage, and to do so on a universal 
scale, by taking the first, and seemingly innocuous step, of convincing the rest of the 
world to acknowledge that “various forms of the family exist.” 
The promotion of reproductive rights 
The EU asserts that this emerging diversity should be protected and promoted by 
a universal recognition of sexual and reproductive rights as well:  
In addition, he stressed the need to support international action towards the 
advancement of women and reproductive health and rights.  Improving young 
women’s ability to choose when and how often to have children was the basis for 
creating strong families and protecting their own families’ health.
32
 
Reproductive rights has become the most contentious subject in international social 
policy of recent times. It has been one of the EU’s most enduring strategies in recent 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16. 
32 United Nations News Centre Press Release, GA/10311, 12 June 2004. 
  17years to elevate reproductive rights language into a UN document such as a convention, 
thereby solidifying and expanding the advances made in the 1990s, when much of the 
sexual and reproductive rights agenda was first included in United Nations conference 
documents like the outcome documents of the International Conference on Population 
and Development (Cairo, 1994) and the Third World Conference on Women (Beijing, 
1995).  
In essence, the EU has strived to promote the legal status of the language, to move 
the language from soft law documents (conference programs of action, for instance) to 
hard law documents (conventions). The enumeration of this intention has become an 
annual goal at the annual Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), with the EU 
announcing the need to turn the conference recommendations and national commitments 
into binding guarantees – into international human rights. In 2005, therefore, the EU 
stated:  
Until the Cairo Programme of Action is implemented in its entirety, including by 
improving standards of maternal health and guaranteeing full access to the 
complete range of sexual and reproductive health services as agreed at Cairo, 
mothers will be unable to provide adequate care and support for their children, 
condemning them to the poverty and ill-health suffered by their parents.
33
 
In 2006, the EU stated: “As stressed in our statement for CSW, gender equality cannot be 
achieved without guaranteeing women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in 
accordance with the ICPD Cairo Agenda.”
34 Again, multilateral opacity is required 
because the EU’s adversaries habitually suspect that the EU is attempting to elevate 
vague reproductive rights language into hard law documents in order to establish a 
universal right to abortion on demand. These suspicions are aided by the fact that 
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  18attending the conferences are lobbyists from major abortion services providers such as 
International Planned Parenthood and Marie Stopes, which openly endorse the inclusion 
of the EU language.  
 
Diverging with the United States on the content of the rights agenda 
 
Ironically, the EU was most successful when it partnered with its most fierce opponent 
today: the United States. Under the Clinton Administration during the 1990s the United 
States and the EU pursued complementary positions on these issues. The EU has proven 
much less successful during the past decade, and the opportunities offered by the tenth 
anniversaries of Cairo and Beijing, opportunities to hold the type of successor 
conferences so common at the UN, were not even taken, with some of the EU’s allied 
non governmental organizations (NGOs) admitting that it would be fruitless, perhaps 
even damaging, to hold such conferences with the presence of the Bush administration at 
the United Nations. It would prove difficult to lead the world on these issues, not only 
without the United States at its side, but in the face of determined opposition from the 
United States. EU member states seemed to sense this possibility at the first major UN 
social policy event at which the Bush administration participated, the Special Session on 
Children of 2001. According to the EU Presidency Statement, the EU was not only 
concerned that it could fail in advancing the cause of the conferences of the 1990s, 
expanding the recommendations and promises that recognized the new family and gender 
norms into rights, but that the Bush administration could manage to roll back the 
outcomes of the conferences themselves.  
  19Although the United States is not mentioned by name in the following quotation, 
the United States was the major antagonist who could “call into question” the conference 
documents:   
The EU will unstintingly work to ensure that the rights to reproductive health care 
and services for boys and girls, rights accepted in all the basic documents of the 




Interestingly, the only significant policy difference between the United States and the EU 
at the Special Session concerned whether the outcome document would recognize that 
adolescents possessed a right to “reproductive health services.” Again, it was on the most 
controversial subject that the EU chose to make a stand and to reject compromise, as well 
as to risk consensus. It was also the most poorly defined – the EU rejected repeated calls 
from the United States, as well as from developing nations, to define the term 
“reproductive health services,” which is perhaps one of the most glaring examples of the 
soft coercion of “multilateral opacity,” of seeking nations to adopt open-ended 
obligations.  
Divergence on the meaning of international law and norms  
Other significant differences between the United States and the European Union 
concerning family can be discerned from the United States statement during debate on 
the General Assembly resolution noting the tenth anniversary of the International Year of 
the Family. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the United States hewing closely to the 
longstanding UN understanding of family as found in such documents as the Universal 
Declaration and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights (and therefore 
hewing closely to the original European liberal project), while the EU is attempting to 
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  20push the UN in new directions that threaten to alienate large numbers of UN Member 
States. According to UN account of the debate, the U.S. representative said that,  
The State did have a role in strengthening families, he added, but it must be 
recognized that the family predated the State as an institution, and existed apart 
from the State.  The State must recognize and acknowledge the family’s rights 
and defend and protect the institution of the family.
36   
 
Echoing the original UN conception of the family as the “natural” group unit of society, 
the US under the Bush administration holds that the family must be protected by the 
state; part of that protection must be considered family insulation from interference from 
the state, itself: “Yet, while the Government should provide a social safety net, the limits 
of State responsibility must be recognized.”
37
The EU, on the other hand, contends that the family is not beyond state scrutiny; 
the EU is interested in the rights of individuals, and the protection of those rights, 
whether those individuals live within families or not. The delegation of the Netherlands 
put it this way: “Everyone also needed to ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms by all family members.”
38  These conceptual differences 
concerning family are profound and extensive. According to the United States, 
government should establish policies to help families to exist on one salary (with the 
implication, unstated, that children do best with one parent in the home):  
Given this understanding of the relationship between the family and the State, the 
principles that should guide governments in their family policy should remain 
focused on efforts to create conditions that allowed strong and healthy families to 
thrive, including keeping the tax burden on families as low as possible and 
attempting to ensure that both parents were not required to enter the workforce to 
maintain a decent standard of living.
39
 
                                                 




  21The concern for the EU, on the other hand, is that family may keep adult members of the 
family, especially women, from being able to pursue professional careers:  
Further, each partner must have the right to choose a profession or employment 
suited to his or her abilities, qualifications and aspirations, as provided under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
40
 
The EU fleshed out the policy implications of this position in 2006, when it stated:   
 
The European Union has focused on women’s experience of work and how to 
address the many practical challenges in this area. These include, for example, 
improving women’s employment rates and tackling women’s unemployment, the 
gender pay gap, sex segregation in the labour market, the unequal share of the 
burden of unpaid labour between women and men, and gender-specific 
inequalities in decision making.
41
 
The United States considers women and men, mothers and fathers, to have 
complementary roles in the family:  
The government should recognize the unique and irreplaceable contributions made 
by both mothers and fathers to children’s development, and also promote healthy 
marriages and the two-parent family.
42
 
The EU statements, on the other hand, assert that the roles of mothers and fathers are 
socially constructed, and therefore the highest form of justice within the family is 
complete gender equality, and the EU is willing to contemplate potentially extensive 
government intervention into families, culture, and the media in order to achieve this 
gender equality. During the 2004 Commission on the Status of Women, the EU stated 
that the world community had to enlist all of civilization, including men and boys, to 
transform masculinity in order to liberate women and to achieve gender equality:  
The European Union emphasizes that the full enjoyment of all human rights by 
women is crucial to the achievement of gender equality and sustainable 
development and peace. However, the goal of gender equality cannot be achieved 
by focusing our strategies and practical work on women only. Therefore, the 
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  22European Union emphasizes the importance of also addressing and changing 
discriminatory male behavior and attitudes and underlines the crucial role of men 
and boys as partners in promoting gender equality. The achievement of gender 
equality is now clearly seen as the responsibility of society as a whole, which 
needs to fully engage men as well as women. Clearly, there are many aspects to 
the role of men in promoting gender equality in society which range over culture, 
socialization processes, the media, educational and gender policies….Linked to 
this challenge are negative male attitudes to women and girls, and understanding 
of masculinity which are still often characterized by gender stereotyping that in 
extreme forms can manifest itself in sexual harassment of women and violence 
against women and girls. The European Union believes that there must be a 
fundamental shift in society’s perception of the roles of both women and men.
43
 
Thus, the scope of the EU rights agenda is a change of mindsets that in some cases 
requires states intervention and enforcement to achieve. In other words, the EU is willing 
to contemplate limiting many of the fundamental freedoms enumerated in the original 
UN founding documents in order to promote its new progressive and gender norms. One 
United Nations document often cited approvingly by the EU, called the International 
Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, actually calls for sweeping and extensive 
government control over the media, religion and the family, itself, in order to establish a 
fundamental shift in society’s perception of the roles of both women and men.  
 
A widening cultural divide in the West? 
From this investigation, it is apparent that the EU is willing to court controversy, and to 
threaten consensus, in order to promote its conception of family in the form of new and 
expanded international human rights. The European Union is willing to upset major 
negotiations in order to push for this agenda, even if the negotiations do not at first 
appear to be closely related to these issues. Such was the case when the World Summit 
for Children came to revolve around a battle over the inclusion of a right to reproductive 
health services for children. Perhaps more importantly, the negotiations over the 
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  23proposed convention on the rights of people with disabilities, the first major hard law 
document on social policy since the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), also 
hinged upon the inclusion of reproductive and sexual rights language. 
  In this regard, the European Union has sought to establish a new, albeit informal, 
block of EU values allies. This block includes most nations of the developed world, with 
the most ardent supporters being nations such as Canada and New Zealand, as well as 
some Latin American and African nations, most notably Brazil and South Africa. If this 
values advocacy is intended to gain the EU a new leadership position at the United 
Nations, in this regard it has succeeded, as many of these countries routinely look to the 
EU for guidance on family issues. 
  By its own measures, the EU has not succeeded in establishing these new human 
rights in support of its current conception of the diverse family. When the EU and its 
allies fought for adolescents’ rights to reproductive health services during the World 
Summit for Children, the EU could not answer repeated questions from nations, including 
the United States, to define what the phrase included. When the Canadian delegation 
admitted that the phrase would include a right to abortion for girls, it was swept from the 
document in a sea of disapproval from the United States and a large proportion of the 
developing world, most notably the nations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). With regard to the Convention on the Rights and Dignity of People with 
Disabilities, the EU and its allies did manage to include some language pertaining to 
sexual and reproductive health, which seems like a victory, but only after the Chairman 
of the convention process had to repeatedly reassure many wary delegations that such 
  24language would create no new international rights, thereby making it appear to an EU 
victory devoid of much legal significance.  
It does not appear that the current approach can serve to strengthen the larger Grotian 
project still formally endorsed by the EU of promoting liberal norms and the rule of law. 
The tension between building a Groatian world order based upon deep belief in 
international law and the coercive approach necessary to promote the new norms as 
international law is strong and growing stronger.  Circumstances may dictate that the EU 
must make a choice between the two projects and to choose to support a now-outdated or 
limited international consensus (that does not gibe with current gender and family norms 
in Europe), or continue to pursue the new normative project, with its seemingly necessary 
multilateral opacity but which threatens the greater consensus and essential respect for 
transparency in international negotiations.  
ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS  
This study set out to determine the effect of the EU’s rights agenda upon the 
international institution of human rights and the resultant effects on interstate society. It 
finds that the EU agenda is increasingly contentious in content, and therefore requires an 
increasingly elitist and coercive approach to implement it. The result is that the overall 
number of shared norms in this regard has diminished in recent years. The EU agenda 
seems to have caused a strengthening of the countervailing institution of sovereignty, in 
the form of increased regional groups blocking attempts to spread contentious norms. 
This appears to have caused a weakening in the institution of human rights. According to 
the vanguard theory of international social structures, the sub-global society of the EU 
  25should have been able to thicken or strengthen the global institution of human rights. 
What happened?  
 A move to pluralism. The situation is indicative of a pluralist world order in which 
weaker states typically rely on sovereignty and international law to protect them from 
stronger states. And stronger states can ignore or bend the rules to suit their interests. 
Said another way, it could be argued that both the United States and the EU are each 
using the international institutions that favor the achievement of their interests. For the 
United States it is the institution of war, and for the EU it is the institutions of human 
rights and international law. No doubt the uses of these institutions will have an effect on 
their legitimacy in the future, just as the two world wars and the horrors of the holocaust 
decreased the legitimacy of war for Europeans and gave rise to human rights.  
Multilateralism and coercion are not mutually exclusive. The second issue with the EU 
approach is that it is essentially coercive and lacks transparency. While this certainly is 
not associated with the use or threat of force, it is nonetheless clear that other states are 
not adopting the EU arguments by “belief.”  While the EU at the UN reflects the broader 
EU commitment to acting in the world through effective multilateralism, this study finds 
that multilateralism and coercion are not mutually exclusive. In the context of 
contemporary diplomacy, this is seen in the move away from transparency and toward an 
elitist reinterpretation of existing rights and enforcement of those interpretations though 
various means.
44  
Decline of the institution of human rights. The rise of human rights among the Western 
powers and globally began with the framing of the UDHR in 1948 and probably lasted 
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  26until the negotiating of the covenants on political and social rights in the mid-1960s.  
Between 1966 and the negotiation of the CEDAW treaty in 1979, fissures in the Western 
international society became apparent. By the time of the Cairo and Beijing conferences 
of 1994 and 1995 these fissures appeared as fractures in understandings about the content 
of international human rights regarding the family. Since 1995, a further deepening of the 
divide has become apparent, and this study has shown a widening of that divide since 
1995 by examining the way the controversy over family rights between the EU on one 
hand and the United States, the OIC and other states and transnational actors on the other.  
Cross currents of sub-global and global IS. Similarly, the “thickening” or move toward 
solidarism of the EU is contrasted with the “thinning” or move toward pluralism 
regarding international human rights during the same time period (1948-present). It 
appears, then, that the vanguard theory does not fully explain what is happening at the 
global level unless it is adapted to account for negative consequences. That is, instead of 
a sub-global society strengthening aspects of that society on the global scale, the 
contentious content and coercive means used to spread the sub-global norms weaken or 
“thin” the institution globally. Thinning of institutions, according to ES scholars, is 
evidence of a more pluralist global order.  Hence, it appears that Bull and Vincent had it 
right.  
CONCLUSIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Barry Buzan’s vanguard theory of international social structures proposes that a very 
strong sub-global society with a shared culture/civilization can strengthen rather than 
weaken aspects of that society on a global scale.
45 Buzan notes:  
                                                 
45 This is what many believe happened in the nineteenth century, when Europe, thickened by shared 
Christian/European culture spread interstate society itself throughout the world and dominated the 
  27Whatever the mechanisms and whatever the rationales, the effect is one of a sub-
global vanguard leading a global development. In the first, classical round of this 
process, the main effect was to expand Westphalian interstate society from 
Europe to global scale. In the second phase, now in its early stages, the main 
attempt will be to increase the number and depth of shared values.
46
 
This study illuminates the possibility of a thinning of that shared Western/Christian 
culture. One might conclude this from observing the EU’s need to repeatedly ally itself 
with China, Brazil and other non-Western states in order to gain momentum necessary to 
promote the new rights agenda while having to distance itself, in outright opposition, to 
the United States. According to Buzan’s vanguard theory, the result of this weakening of 
the Western alliance is global instability: 
 If it fails badly, by seriously dividing its core, or by pushing too hard on 
contested values (most obviously democracy, human rights), or by failing to 
deliver promised effects (e.g. economic development and better distributed 
wealth), or by delivering damaging side-effects…it could give rise once again to 
oppositional sub-global interstate/international societies.
47
 
  We must ask at this point how much the contentiousness and divisiveness of the 
new rights agenda really matters. Does it have spill over effects into grand strategy, or do 
states compartmentalize? Many of the states at sharpest odds with the U.S. in matters of 
sexual and family norms (U.K., Canada, and New Zealand) are allies in the War on 
Terror, for example. Does this indicate that gender and family norms are of little 
consequence at the highest levels of EU leadership? Even though security strategies are 
often thought of as rhetorical and even propagandistic, it is puzzling that human rights 
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  28and multilateralism feature so centrally in the EU’s most recent security strategy if that is 
true. Either way, the current rights agenda seems out of step with the stated EU foreign 
policy goals.  
  Another variable is trend in thickening or thinning of Islamic culture, one of the 
main counterweights and obstacles to the EU agenda. The EU has made some advances 
in promoting sexual and reproductive rights in Muslim countries, but has encountered a 
backlash from the region on homosexual rights. The stiff opposition of the United States 
under the Bush administration will invariably end in 2009. Whether a Democratic or 
Republican White House replaces the Bush administration, 2009 will no doubt find the 
EU with an ally or less fierce opponent in its rights agenda, and thus the EU could very 
well make significant gains in codification of the new norms. One could therefore regard 
the next few years as a turning point for the EU’s agenda. A united front from the 
Western countries, even if for four years, would likely create significant animosity in 
OIC states and a strengthening of anti-Western sentiment.  
More research into the causes and effects of this situation will help. Barry Buzan 
once argued that Martin Wight over-emphasized the role of coercion in international 
society.
48 Yet coercion is too often downplayed in the study of norm dynamics. It is time 
to bring Wight back in, especially the study of his third tradition, the revolutionist 
tradition, with its movements of “subversion and liberation”.  Present day rights 
enthusiasts bear the marks of the third tradition in the way the norms they promote are 
often at odds with established cultural and religious traditions, in the way they take on a 
religious zeal, and in the way they often seek the end (establishing the rights) without due 
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  29regard for the means (preserving the institution of rights).
49 For Wight, who believed the 
notion of international society very closely tied to that of natural law, the post war era 
was a move away from Grotianism and toward realism and revolutionism. This study 
finds that resurge of revolutionism deeply attached to, perhaps imbedded in, the 
institutions of Grotianism.  
Future scholarship should better account for the truly normative or moral 
dimension of the dynamic of social structures on the international level. We believe 
Buzan’s vanguard theory could be a useful way to explore this relationship and to further 
account for the effects of EU integration and norm dynamics on the broader institution of 
human rights and international society. This will require Wight’s keen insight into 
competing ideologies and Buzan’s extensive work with respect to social structures and 
institutions. Such a project may also help find ways to mend the widening breach among 
Western powers in their respective rights agendas.  
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